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Abstract
This chapter presents some of the exceptional characteristics of recent Hispanic immi-
gration to the United States. In 2005, there were nearly 40 million Hispanic immigrants 
and descendants of Hispanic immigrants living in the U.S. The assimilation experience 
of this large cultural group does not seem to be following the path past immigrants to 
the U.S. followed. Most third generation Hispanics in the U.S. still find themselves with 
income and education levels below the U.S. averages. Most forecasts predict that about 
60 million Hispanics and Hispanic-Americans will be living in the U.S. by 2030. 
◘     ◘     ◘
The persistent inflow of Hispanic immigrants threatens to divide the United States into two 
peoples, two cultures, and two languages. 
Samuel Huntington (2006) 1 
Americans living in smaller U.S. cities like Little Rock, Arkansas, Raleigh, North Car-
olina, and Omaha, Nebraska, are often surprised to learn that there is a Mexican Con-
sulate in their city. In fact, aside from the obvious locations of consulates, such as New 
York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles, in 2007 there were 47 Mexican Consulates in cit-
ies throughout the U.S. This proliferation of Mexican diplomatic offices across the U.S. 
reflects the extraordinary increase in Mexican immigrants living in the U.S. There are 
about 11 million Mexican immigrants in the United States, and another ten million U.S. 
born Mexican Americans. Mexicans make up nearly two-thirds of the overall group of 
Hispanic immigrants in the United States, and Hispanics, in turn, account for nearly 
one-half of all foreign-born residents in the United States. 
The rapid growth of immigration to the U.S. from Latin America has increased the 
overall Hispanic population of the U.S. The social group commonly referred to as His-
panics includes all immigrants from Latin American countries and their offspring. So 
1 From Huntington (2004). 
316 H. Van den Berg & Ö. B. BodVarsson in The economics of immigraTion  (2009) 
Table 1.  Estimates of Hispanic population in the United States: 2000 and 2005 
      Census 2000a              %                       2005 Community         % 
                                         surveyb 
Total Hispanic 35,305,818 100.0 41,926,302 100.0
Mexican 20,640,711 58.5 26,784,268 63.9
Puerto Rican 3,406,178 9.6 3,794,776 9.1
Cuban 1,241,685 3.5 1,462,593 3.5
Dominican 764,945 2.2 1,135,756 2.7
Central American 1,686,937 4.8 3,114,877 7.4
Costa Rican 68,588 0.2 111,978 0.3
Guatemalan 372,487 1.1 780,191 1.9
Honduran 217,569 0.6 466,843 1.1
Nicaraguan 177,684 0.5 275,126 0.7
Panamanian 91,723 0.3 141,286 0.3
Salvadoran 655,165 1.9 1,240,031 3.0
South American 1,353,562 3.8 2,237,960 5.3
Argentinean 100,864 0.3 189,303 0.5
Bolivian 42,068 0.1 68,649 0.2
Chilean 68,849 0.2 105,141 0.3
Colombian 470,684 1.3 723,596 1.7
Ecuadorian 260,559 0.7 432,068 1.0
Peruvian 233,926 0.7 415,352 1.0
Uruguayan 18,804 0.1 51,646 0.1
Venezuelan 91,507 0.3 162,762 0.4
Other 57,532 0.2 89,443 0.2
All Otherc  6,211,800 17.6 3,396,072 8.1
a Table 3 from Suro (2002). 
b Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of the Census Bureau’s 2005 American Community Survey, re-
ported in “A Statistical Portrait of Hispanics at Mid-Decade,” downloaded from http://pewhis-
panic.org/docs/ December 1, 2007 
c This category includes Hispanics from other Caribbean countries and people who define them-
selves as Hispanics or Latinos without specifying any Hispanic country. Such general classifica-
tions are more common on voluntary Census returns than in the Community Survey interviews. 
2 As reported in the Associated Press (2003), Hispanics Outnumber Blacks in U.S. Minority Population.
large has been recent Hispanic immigration to the U.S. that, in 2002, Hispanics passed 
African Americans as the largest minority ethnic group in the U.S. In that year, the U.S. 
Census Bureau estimated that there were about 37 million Hispanics in the U.S., com-
pared to 36.1 million African Americans.2 Table 1 details the 2000 U.S. Census data on 
the Hispanic population. 
A controversial book by Samuel Huntington (2004) entitled Who Are We? The Chal-
lenges to America’s Identity reflects the sentiments of some Americans with regard to 
the large inflow of Spanish speaking immigrants. As the sample quote by Huntington 
shown at the head of this chapter suggests, Huntington does not view the massive His-
panic immigration to the U.S. favorably. He argues that Hispanic immigrants are less 
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likely than previous immigrants to the U.S. to assimilate, learn English, and reach in-
come parity with native-born Americans. Huntington is not alone in his views. His-
panic immigration seems to be the focus of the increasingly active opposition to immi-
gration in the U.S., not unlike the anti-immigrant movement in Germany that focuses 
on the rapid growth of Turkish immigration to Germany or the French opposition to 
further immigration from North Africa. Sudden large inflows of immigrants from a sin-
gle foreign culture have always led to resistance in the destination country. 
There is little doubt that the current wave of Hispanic immigration to the United 
States will bring major economic and social changes to both the source and destination 
countries. It will be a challenge for the U.S. to devise a set of policies to effectively deal 
with this disruptive but potentially beneficial immigration episode. The difficulties the 
U.S. Congress faced when it tried to enact practical legislation to modify the country’s 
poorly designed immigration system in 2006 and 2007 underscores the complexity of 
the issue and the many conflicting interests and views that must be dealt with. From a 
social scientist’s perspective, we can learn a lot from the U.S. experience with Hispanic 
immigration. Other countries face similar movements of people and clashes of cultures, 
as evidenced by the conflicts surrounding the growth of the non-Christian population 
in many European countries. This chapter summarizes what we know about Hispanic 
immigration to the United States, and it points to where we need further research and 
analysis. 
1. The Characteristics of Hispanic Immigration 
Immigration to the United States has gone through many different phases. The lat-
est phase, which covers the years since the 1960s, is characterized by a sharp shift in im-
migration source countries from Europe to Latin America and Asia. Hispanics make up 
the largest share of new arrivals. Nearly half of all foreign-born persons currently living 
in the U.S. came from Mexico, Central America, South America, or the Spanish-speak-
ing Caribbean countries. Table 2 provides detailed figures for 2005. 
Over 30% of foreign-born Americans are natives of Mexico. This is a very high share 
for one single country. The concentration of the sources of immigration has fueled fears 
that Hispanics will establish a permanent parallel culture in the United States rather 
than assimilate into the dominant culture. Recall, again, Huntington’s words at the start 
of the chapter. Many of those who expect Mexican and other Hispanic immigrants to 
eventually assimilate like all other immigrant groups have done in the past neverthe-
less still fear that the massive inflow of people from one single foreign country will sub-
stantially change American culture. 
It is interesting to ask why reactions to Hispanic immigration are so much less fa-
vorable than reactions to recent immigration from Asia. Asian immigration to the U.S. 
does not seem to generate the same emotional response among the native U.S. popula-
tion that Hispanic immigration does. This is surprising because Asian immigration to 
the U.S. has grown just as fast as immigration from Hispanic countries. Perhaps Asian 
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immigration seems less threatening because its sources are spread evenly among sev-
eral distinctive cultures. For example, the Philippines, India, China, Vietnam, and South 
Korea each account for between 3 and 4.5% of foreign-born Americans. Another possi-
ble factor is that a greater percentage of Asian immigrants are highly educated profes-
sionals while the great majority of Hispanic immigrants are laborers with less than high 
school education. 
Another reason that Hispanic immigration may generate more openly expressed 
concerns is that it has been highly concentrated in a few states such as California, New 
York, Florida, and Texas. This geographic concentration effectively amplifies the cul-
tural influence of immigrants in those areas. This is not to say that all Hispanic im-
migration to these states is from the same countries; Mexican immigrants favor Cali-
fornia and Texas, while immigrants from Caribbean countries such as Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic most often settled in Florida and New York, respectively. Central 
Americans have favored California. Also, in recent years Hispanic immigrants have in-
creasingly settled in Southern and Midwestern states, where food processing and other 
manufacturing are concentrated. It is not clear yet whether this wider dispersion of His-
panic immigrants merely makes new regions of the U.S. more aware of immigration or 
whether it reduces the fear that Hispanic immigration will establish a permanent paral-
lel culture in the U.S. 
Table 2.  Country of birth of foreign-born living in the United States the 20 largest sending coun-
tries: 2005 
         Number      Percent of all                          Number       Percent of all  
       Foreign-born                              Foreign-born
Country              Country   
Mexico 10,993,851 30.7 Guatemala 644,669 1.8
Philippines 1,594,805 4.5 Germany 626,504 1.8
India 1,410,731 3.9 Jamaica 579,241 1.6
China 1,202,923 3.4 Colombia 554,821 1.6
Vietnam 1,072,881 3.0 Haiti 483,748 1.4
Korea 993,883 2.8 Poland 449,158 1.3
El Salvador 988,014 2.8 Honduras 387,002 1.1
Cuba 902,448 2.5 Italy 385,973 1.1
Canada 830,300 2.3 Russia 381,169 1.1
Dominican Republic 708,455 2.0 Peru 371,980 1.0
Region/ethnicity      
Total Hispanic 16,840,774 47.1   
South and East Asia 8,385,165 23.4   
Middle East 1,220,776 3.4   
All Other 9,322,888 26.1   
Total foreign born  35,769,603 100.0   
Source: Pew Hispanic Center (2006), “Tabulations using data from the 2005 American Community 
Survey,” October 2006. 
Hispanic immigration to tHe United states     319
Hispanic immigrants are disproportionately young and working aged. Figure 1 
shows the population profiles for foreign-born Hispanics in the lower left-hand di-
agram and non-Hispanic Americans in the upper right-hand diagram. Compared to 
the overall U.S. population, very few foreign-born Hispanics are either very young or 
very old. The great majority of foreign-born Hispanics are of working age. This im-
plies that, all other things equal, Hispanic immigrants are likely to be self-support-
ing and productive. On the other hand, the lower right-hand diagram in Figure 1 
makes it obvious that Hispanic families have more children than Americans, on aver-
age. Hence, the U.S.-born Hispanic population is relatively young. With the youth of 
the native-born Hispanic population, the population profile of the combined foreign-
born and native-born Hispanic population in the U.S. is, on average, younger than 
the overall U.S. population. In a sense, Hispanic immigration has mitigated, at least 
in part, the problems associated with the ageing of the U.S. population. Compared to 
most other high income countries, population ageing is not nearly as serious a prob-
lem in the U.S. 
Figure 1. Population pyramids for Hispanic and non-Hispanic populations in the U.S.: 2005.
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2. Assimilation 
Historical evidence suggests that immigrants to the U.S. have almost always assim-
ilated within one or two generations. Even at the previous height of immigration at 
the start of the twentieth century, when the foreign-born population surpassed 15% of 
the total population, immigrants quickly moved up to the average income and educa-
tion levels of the native U.S. population. Blau’s (1980) often-referenced study used de-
tailed data for the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to determine that immi-
grants quickly caught up to native-born Americans in income. Equally well-known is 
Chiswick’s (1978) study, which used 1970 Census data to show that immigrants’ earn-
ings caught up to, and then exceeded, native-born Americans’ average incomes after 
just 10 or 15 years. These average outcomes do not describe all immigrants a century 
ago, of course. There were high rates of return immigration after World War I and dur-
ing the Great Depression, and many immigrants and their descendants remained poor. 
However, today even the average indicators for immigrant assimilation suggest that 
the traditional myth of immigrants as anxious to assimilate and become “American” as 
quickly as possible may be inaccurate. 
Perlmann and Waldinger’s (1997) statistical analysis shows that in the 1990s the 
children of immigrants still lagged substantially behind the rest of the U.S. population 
in education, income, and in terms of other socioeconomic indicators. Perlmann and 
Waldinger’s data on recent immigrants in the U.S. suggest that U.S. immigration from 
Latin America, and from Mexico in particular, is the main cause of the change in as-
similation rates. When they eliminate Mexican immigrants from their sample, they find 
that the socioeconomic disadvantage among children of immigrants vanishes. Hence, 
they conclude that Mexican immigrants are somehow different from earlier immigrants 
to the U.S. 
2.1   Hispanics’ Slow Assimilation 
Table 3 provides further insight into how Hispanic immigration differs from im-
migration overall and to other specific groups of immigrants. Notice that, compared 
to the native population or native households, immigrants and immigrant house-
holds from Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America all have 
higher concentrations in the lower income categories. Note also that Asian immi-
grants and immigrant households have higher median incomes and greater concen-
trations in higher-income brackets compared to the native-born American population 
and households. Hence, the data indeed suggest that Hispanic immigrants, on aver-
age, do not raise their economic status very quickly. Of course, assimilation is never 
a matter of a few years; it normally takes at least a generation. Hence, the data in Ta-
ble 3 may not be a good indication of assimilation for the large numbers of Hispanic 
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immigrants to the U.S. Also, there are many other indicators that could be used to 
show how quickly immigrants assimilate, such as language fluency, mixed marriages, 
housing, education, and university graduation rates, and we will examine these alter-
native indicators below. 
Research on the assimilation of Mexican Americans in the U.S. shows that new im-
migrants from Mexico and other Hispanic countries earn substantially less than U.S. na-
tives. But, more ominously, studies such as Livingston and Kahn (2002) find that second 
generation Mexican Americans only partially catch up to the U.S. average, and third 
generation Mexican Americans show no further progress at all in catching up. Borjas 
(1985, 1994) uses evidence of the stalled economic progress after the second generation 
to argue that “the huge skill differentials observed among today’s foreign-born groups 
become tomorrow’s differences among American-born ethnic groups.”3 In short, there 
is evidence that a permanent gap between Hispanics and other Americans may be in 
the making. 
Trejo (1997, 2003) looks at the causes of the lack of income growth for Mexican im-
migrants, and he concludes that the differences in income between Mexican Ameri-
cans and other U.S. residents are largely explained by differences in human capital. In 
his studies, Trejo provides evidence showing that Mexican Americans do not continue 
catching up between the second and third generations because they do not continue to 
increase their relative levels of human capital after the second generation. 
Duncan and Trejo (2006) survey the various studies of assimilation by Mexican 
Americans, and they report that between the first and second generations, average 
schooling rises by almost four years, and incomes rise by 30%. But then advancement 
stops, and third generation Mexican Americans still have 1.3 fewer years of education 
than the average American, and incomes are still about 25% lower. Suro and Passel 
(2003) examine income and education attainment and find the same pattern of rapid 
advancement from the first to the second generations of Hispanic immigrants, followed 
by little change from the second to the third generations. Table 4 summarizes the data 
from a special survey by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
When it comes to English language skills, however, Suro and Passel (2003) find 
a continued improvement in English proficiency from the second to the third gen-
erations. While fewer than half of all second generation Hispanic immigrants live 
in households where English is the dominant language, nearly 80% of third gener-
ation Hispanics do. Table 5 details the English proficiency of Hispanics. Also, Suro 
and Passel show that Hispanics do assimilate socially after the second generation. 
Only 8% of first-generation Hispanics marry someone outside their ethnic group, 
nearly one-third of second-generation immigrants do, and 57% of third-generation 
Hispanic immigrants do. Therefore, in terms of this indicator, assimilation is clearly 
occurring. 
Blau and Kahn (2005) use the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey data 
for 1994–2003 to distinguish the assimilation of male and female Mexican Americans 
in order to determine whether gender differences can explain the slow assimilation in 
3 George J. Borjas (1994, p. 1713). 
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terms of income. They find that immediately after immigrating to the U.S., Mexican 
male and female immigrants both work fewer hours per week than their average U.S. 
counterparts. But, in terms of hours worked they catch up within 20 years. Wages re-
ceived remain far below the national average for Mexican immigrants, however, and 
this differential shrinks only with the second generation Mexican Americans for both 
men and women, largely because of increased levels of education. However, as other 
studies have found, there is little further improvement in education, labor supply, or 
wages beyond the second generation. 
Mexican immigrants are more likely to be married than Americans overall, and fer-
tility levels also exceed U.S. averages for women. Marriage rates remain above the U.S. 
average through the third generation, and while female fertility declines by the third 
generation, it remains above the U.S. average. Blau and Kahn (2005) conclude that Mex-
ican American families continue to exhibit a family structure more similar to Mexican 
families than American families. Again, it appears as though Mexican Americans do 
not assimilate as fast as previous immigrant groups have done. Table 6 presents data 
from the Census Bureau’s 2005 community Survey that support the conclusions by Blau 
and Kahn. 
2.2   Further Reasons Why Hispanic Assimilation is Slow 
Hispanic immigrants appear to be less entrepreneurial than other immigrant groups 
or Americans in general. Combined with the lower levels of education of Hispanic im-
migrants, the below average levels of entrepreneurial activity further reduce Hispanics’ 
access to the traditional routes that past immigrants have used to quickly reach aver-
age U.S. income levels. Fairlie and Woodruff (2006) find that only 6% of Mexican im-
migrants to the United States are self-employed. This outcome contrasts sharply with 
other immigrant groups to the U.S., which all exhibit self-employment rates more sim-
ilar to native country self-employment rates. Interestingly, Mexican immigrants’ low 
rate of self-employment also contrasts sharply with the very high rate of self-employ-
ment in Mexico. Mexico has the highest self-employment rate of 28 OECD countries, 
and it is ranked fourth among a larger sample of 41 countries by the Global Entrepre-
neurship Monitor (2003).4 Yuengert (1995) reports that across all immigrant groups, 
self-employment rates are usually positively correlated with native country rates. This 
relationship does not hold for Hispanic immigrants to the United States, however. 
The drastic fall in self-employment when Mexicans and other Hispanics cross the 
U.S. border begs for an explanation. At the very least, the phenomenon suggests that 
Mexican American immigrants and their children face barriers to entrepreneurship. 
Perhaps the lack of self-employment is due to the high percentage of unauthorized 
immigrants among Hispanic immigrants; unauthorized immigrants do not have ac-
4 Reported in Fairlie and Woodruff (2006). 
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cess to bank financing, they cannot acquire the required permits and licenses to op-
erate businesses, and they cannot use the courts to protect themselves against fraud, 
theft, and delinquent payments. Or, the lack of self-employment and, presumably, 
entrepreneurship may itself be a direct result of the slow assimilation of Hispanics 
into U.S. society. 
The low rate of self-employment among Hispanics not only contributes to Hispanics’ 
lack of income mobility, it may also be preventing the U.S. economy from gaining the 
full growth dividend from immigration. Recall from Chap. 9 that Joseph Schumpeter 
Table 6.  Family structure of U.S. immigrants by region of birth: 2005 
                                     Family household  
                          Married couple    Female head           Male head           Non-family  
                                                                        only                      only            household                     Total
Native born 158,063,089 40,142,786 12,818,558 41,604,783 252,629,216
Foreign born 23,367,506 4,463,987 3,165,419 4,772,691 35,769,603
Mexico 7,179,023 1,471,870 1,399,503 943,455 10,993,851
Asia 6,110,777 744,171 507,797 1,022,420 8,385,165
Caribbean 1,675,811 732,483 252,695 489,803 3,150,792
Central America 1,385,611 435,377 371,817 316,521 2,509,326
South America 1,489,419 357,092 235,919 353,848 2,436,278
Middle East 853,719 92,373 97,132 177,552 1,220,776
All Other 4,673,146 630,621 300,556 1,469,092 7,073,415
Percentages of population 
Native born 62.6 15.9 5.1 16.5 100.0
Foreign born 65.3 12.5 8.8 13.3 100.0
Mexico 65.3 13.4 12.7 8.6 100.0
Asia 72.9 8.9 6.1 12.2 100.0
Caribbean 53.2 23.2 8.0 15.5 100.0
Central America 55.2 17.4 14.8 12.6 100.0
South America 61.1 14.7 9.7 14.5 100.0
Middle East 69.9 7.6 8.0 14.5 100.0
All Other 66.1 8.9 4.2 20.8 100.0
Percentages of households 
Native born 49.2 12.4 4.1 34.3 100.0
Foreign born 55.8 13.4 7.6 23.1 100.0
Mexico 60.2 14.9 11.7 13.3 100.0
Asia 63.3 9.2 5.2 22.2 100.0
Caribbean 42.3 24.2 6.9 26.6 100.0
Central America 49.5 19.5 12.1 18.9 100.0
South America 50.8 16.6 8.7 23.9 100.0
Middle East 60.1 7.5 7.1 25.4 100.0
All Other 51.6 9.2 3.7 35.5 100.0
Source: Pew Hispanic Center (2006), “Tabulations using data from the 2005 American Community 
Survey,” October 2006, Tables 15 and 16. 
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considered the entrepreneur as something of a social deviant because his or her attitude 
was different from the average member of society. Schumpeter pointed out that entre-
preneurs were often recent immigrants because immigrants tend to be less attached to 
the traditions of society and, therefore, less reluctant to innovate. Furthermore, through 
natural selection, immigrants tend to be people who are more willing to take risks in 
exchange for potential future gains. Chiswick (2000) wrote that immigrants self-select 
in terms of personal characteristics favorable to economic growth: “The greater the out 
of pocket (direct) costs of migration and return migration, the greater the effect of abil-
ity on lowering the costs of migration, and the smaller are the wage differences by skill 
in the lower income origin than in the higher income destination.” International migra-
tion, therefore, provides a natural selection process that distinguishes exceptionally ad-
venturesome and enterprising people. 
This discussion suggests that unless the U.S. finds ways to reduce the barriers to en-
trepreneurship that seem to apply disproportionately to Hispanic immigrants, the U.S. 
economy will suffer. Assimilation will be slower than necessary, which means that His-
panic immigrants will add less to U.S. output and demand. The barriers to entrepre-
neurship that Hispanics seem to face imply that the U.S. economy will continue to miss 
the full growth effect of immigration. 
Finally, Lazear (2006) blames Hispanic immigrants’ slow assimilation on the way 
the U.S. has designed its immigration policies. He argues, first of all, that U.S. immi-
gration policy results in a very large proportion of Mexicans and Hispanics entering 
the country either illegally because of Latin America’s proximity to the U.S. and lax 
U.S. border enforcement. And when Hispanics immigrate legally, it is almost always 
under the family reunion criterion rather than on the basis of their skills, educational 
attainment, or job prospects. Both unauthorized immigration and family reunion tend 
to promote settlement in ethnic enclaves. According to Lazear, the large numbers of 
Hispanic immigrants means that they live in very large enclaves that encourage immi-
grants to hold on to their own customs longer and assimilate more slowly than other 
ethnic groups that begin in small enclaves. There are Spanish language newspapers, 
radio stations, and television stations in nearly all cities where there are Hispanic en-
claves. The larger populations in the Hispanic enclaves also result in more second and 
third generation Hispanics marrying other Hispanics rather than partners with other 
ethnic backgrounds. 
2.3   Perhaps It Is All a Data Problem 
Duncan and Trejo (2005) suggest a completely different reason why the data shows 
Hispanic immigrants to have assimilated so slowly. They argue that the census data 
used in most studies give an inaccurate impression because the children of mixed par-
ents, e.g., when a Mexican American marries a non-Mexican American, are often not re-
ported as being Mexican Americans. Also, the children of mixed couples most likely as-
similate much faster, and such children are increasingly unlikely to classify themselves 
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in the Census as Hispanics. In other words, the data may be tracing mostly the assim-
ilation histories of the children of parents who assimilated less, in part because they 
married a spouse from the same ethnic group. The Census data are likely to miss many 
of the children of the parents that assimilated more quickly and found spouses in other 
ethnic groups. Hence, true assimilation of Mexican Americans is faster and more com-
plete than the Census data suggest. 
In a study that pre-dated many of the recent studies which find that assimilation 
stagnates after the second generation, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1988) used data that 
tracks individuals over time rather than the standard Census data to argue that assim-
ilation of Hispanics was not any slower than previous large immigrant groups in the 
early twentieth century. Their time-series data for individual households indicate faster 
occupational mobility than the Census data suggest.5 
2.4   Political Attitudes of Hispanic Immigrants 
The slower assimilation of Hispanic immigrants may be, in part, the result of the 
strong ties to their native countries that many immigrants maintain. Such ties are often 
encouraged by the governments of the native countries. In fact, a number of Western 
Hemisphere countries have recently changed their national laws to encourage perma-
nent immigrants to maintain ties with their native country. In the past, most countries 
cut off citizenship when citizens immigrate and acquire citizenship in another coun-
try, but in recent years Colombia, Ecuador, Brazil, Mexico, and the Dominican Repub-
lic, among others, have changed their laws to permit dual citizenship. Mexico even al-
lows former citizens to reclaim Mexican citizenship after they had lost it by becoming 
citizens in the United States. In 2004, President Fox asked the Mexican Congress to ap-
prove letting millions of Mexican citizens living in the United States vote in the 2006 
Mexican presidential election.6 The Mexican state of Zacatecas passed a law in 2003 to 
let the 800,000 Zacatecans who now live in the United States run for local political of-
fice.7 The President of the Dominican Republic in 2004, himself a former resident of 
New York, attributed his electoral victory to the huge number of votes by Dominicans 
living in New York who, like Mexicans living abroad, had gained the right to vote in 
their native country.8 
A 2004 Pew Hispanic Center survey of Mexican immigrants who visited a Mexi-
can consulate in the U.S. to apply for a matricula consular, an identity card issued by 
the Mexican government that helps unauthorized immigrants open a U.S. bank ac-
count, acquire medical services in the U.S., and provide proof of age, suggests that 
5 Jasso and Rosenzweig (1988). 
6 Weiner (2004). 
7 Authers (2004). 
8 Bernstein (2004). 
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many Mexican immigrants living in the U.S. intend to continue voting in Mexican 
elections.9 Nearly 9 out of 10 (87%) respondents said they would vote in the next 
elections if they could. Granted, the survey sample was biased; Mexican immigrants 
who seek a matricula consular are almost always unauthorized immigrants who can-
not obtain U.S. identity documents. On average, unauthorized immigrants are less 
likely to assimilate because they face many barriers to jobs, education, and social 
organizations.10 
These suggestions that today’s Hispanic immigrants are less likely to assimilate than 
earlier U.S. immigrants should be kept in perspective, however. The fact is that newly 
arriving immigrants to the U.S. have always maintained close ties with their native 
countries. Most immigrant communities a century ago had newspapers in the native 
languages of immigrants, ethnic food stores and restaurants, and clubs and associations 
organized along national lines. When radio became a dominant medium in the early 
twentieth century, foreign language programs were regularly broadcast in cities with 
significant immigrant enclaves. There was a Hibernian Hall in most cities of the U.S. 
Northeast where Irish immigrants met. The Sons of Italy sponsored sports and social 
activities for Italian immigrants in many of the same cities. Of course, many churches 
and other religious organizations established in the U.S. reflected specific national ori-
gins and ethnic traditions. In any case, the high rates of return immigration discussed 
in Bodvarsson and Van den Berg, The Economics of Immigration (2009), Chapter 10, suggest that 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries cultural and family ties to the homeland 
often trumped assimilation. 
3. Geographic Diffusion 
One common characteristic of immigration is that immigrants tend to cluster to-
gether in the destination countries, often in what become easily identifiable ethnic 
communities. In the United States, Hispanic immigrants have tended to also cluster in 
certain urban areas and certain states. What is also well known is that Hispanic immi-
grants from specific towns and regions of their native countries cluster together in spe-
cific towns and regions in the United States. 
3.1   Networks and Herding 
An accepted explanation for clustering is the presence of network externalities. In 
the case of immigration, earlier immigrants provide assistance to new immigrants, and 
previous immigrants can provide trusted information about the destination to other 
9 Suro (2005). 
10 As quoted in Pascal (1998). 
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immigrants. Bauer, Epstein, and Gang (2002) differentiate between network effects and 
what they call herding behavior. They define immigrant network effects as immigrants 
deciding “I will go to where my people are, since it will help me.” Herding behavior, on 
the other hand, implies immigrants tell themselves: “I will go to where I have observed 
others go, because all these others who went before me probably have information that 
I do not have, even though I would have chosen independently to go elsewhere.” Herd-
ing behavior effectively assumes that people have little confidence in their own infor-
mation, and they feel that others’ information must be better than theirs. In either case, 
networks or herding, immigrants from the same source countries tend to concentrate in 
certain communities, states, or regions. Hispanic immigrants have certainly done this, 
as suggested in Table 7. 
Bauer, Epstein, and Gang examine data for Mexican immigrants to the United States 
to test for the relative importance of herding and network effects in determining immi-
grant location decisions. They label as herding the practice of natives from the same lo-
cal community following fellow community members to specific locations in the U.S. 
Network externalities are measured by the share of Mexican immigrants in the pop-
ulation of a specific community in the U.S. Bauer, Epstein, and Gang find that both 
herding and network effects matter; one reinforces the other. The network effect is not 
linear, however. Network effects expand immigration to a specific community up to 
where Mexicans account for about 10% of the community’s population, after which the 
strength of network externalities declines. The network effect is U-shaped, therefore. 
Herding effects are similarly U-shaped. In addition, network and herding effects are 
significantly stronger for illegal immigrants and poorly-educated immigrants. 
3.2   Towards the South and the Midwest 
There has been a noticeable diffusion of Hispanic immigrants to a more diverse set 
of destinations in recent years. Kochlar, Suro, and Tafoya (2005) report that the His-
panic population is growing faster in the Southern states than anywhere else in the 
United States. Table 8 presents some of these authors’ data showing that the highest 
growth rates of Hispanic immigration were in Southern states. They describe how the 
economies in the South and the Midwest are changing rapidly, and they are growing 
rapidly as well: “Such conditions have acted as a magnet to young, male, foreign-born 
Latinos migrating in search of economic opportunities.” 
Card and Lewis (2005) analyze the spread of Mexican immigrants beyond the tra-
ditional destination cities in California and Texas to “new” destinations like Atlanta, 
Georgia, Denver, Colorado, Portland, Oregon, and Raleigh-Durham, North Carolina. 
They are surprised by how these flows to “new” destinations parallel the growth of 
employment without very large changes in wage rates in those destination economies. 
Card and Lewis conclude that they are “left with the ‘puzzle’ of explaining the remark-
able flexibility of employment demand in different cities to local variations in supply.” 
Is this a case of immigrants arriving and jobs then suddenly appearing to employ them? 
Or do the immigrants respond quickly to the opening of new jobs in these “new” desti-
nation cities? 
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3.3   The Dispersal of Manufacturing Jobs and Immigrant Dispersal 
This dispersal of the growing number of Hispanic immigrants is not such a puz-
zle when it is viewed in light of the gradual shifts in manufacturing activity in the U.S. 
over the past half century. Hispanic immigrants have largely followed the dispersion of 
manufacturing activity to rural areas in the South, Midwest, and Great Plains regions. 
The current shift of manufacturing from the traditional manufacturing centers to rural 
regions of the American Midwest and Great Plains is fundamentally a continuation of 
the earlier trends that saw manufacturing shift from the traditional urban centers of the 
Northeast and North central regions of the country toward those regions in the South 
where wages are lower and unions are less powerful. The current growth of manufac-
turing in traditionally agricultural communities is also being driven by the arrival of 
foreign firms setting up manufacturing in the U.S. for the first time. These foreign green-
field investments similarly seek low labor costs, lower living costs for prospective em-
ployees, and business friendly environments. 
This geographic shift in manufacturing has been well documented and studied. 
However, commentators and researchers have largely overlooked a very important 
detail about the growth of manufacturing in rural America: The revival of the rural 
South, Midwest, and Great Plains depends on foreign immigrants. The people mov-
ing in to take the new manufacturing jobs are often recent immigrants, and a sub-
stantial portion of them are undocumented. Rural communities in the United States 
enjoy a comparative advantage in infrastructure and location; the United States’ mod-
Table 8.  Hispanic population change in the U.S.: 1990–2000 
 Hispanics 1990 Hispanics 2000 % Change
6 Southern states  293,445 1,195,800 308
North Carolina 76,726 378,963 394
Arkansas 19,876 86,866 337
Georgia 108,922 435,227 300
Tennessee 32,741 123,838 278
South Carolina 30,551 95,076 211
Alabama 24,629 75,830 208
Traditional settlement states  11,546,271 16,481,592 43
California 7,687,938 10,966,556 43
New York 2,214,026 2,867,583 30
Illinois 904,446 1,530,262 69
New Jersey 739,861 1,117,191 51
Source: Table 2 from Kochlar, Suro, and Tafoya (2005). 
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ern transportation infrastructure places most rural communities within the distribu-
tion systems serving the U.S. market for most products. The only thing lacking in 
these communities is a large labor force. Immigration effectively provides this miss-
ing labor force. The fact that it is manufacturing that is driving the immigration flows 
is compatible with the observation that the “new” immigrant destinations are not see-
ing a reduction in white and black populations; to the contrary, the main immigrant 
destinations are experiencing increases in new black and white populations as well. 
For example, Kochlar, Suro, and Tafoya (2005) report that even in the six Southern 
states, where Hispanic populations grew so rapidly, white and black populations still 
grew by 11 and 21%, respectively, from much higher bases over the same 1990–2000 
period. 
It is immigration that is the key to the growth of manufacturing in rural commu-
nities in the U.S. There is a seemingly endless “reserve army of labor” in the develop-
ing economies of the world. Their distant locations, poorly developed transportation 
systems, and lack of human and physical capital are all factors that have kept returns 
to labor very low in those countries. Failing institutions, furthermore, cause economic 
failures and unemployment. Modern communications and cheap transport make it in-
creasingly possible for labor to move across borders in response to wage differences. 
Hence, producers prefer to operate in the U.S. where infrastructure is ample and dis-
tances to markets are short. 
Our broad model of technological progress and shifting production patterns sug-
gests that rural communities in areas like Appalachia and the Great Plains would not 
be able to reverse their declines without immigration. Indeed, if manufacturing con-
tinues to face increasing labor costs in the highly agglomerated urban regions of the 
United States, manufacturers and producers of services will increasingly look to lower 
cost locations. If low cost labor is not available somewhere within the U.S., the likeli-
hood increases that manufacturing will instead move to China, India, or Brazil. In this 
case, the rural economies of Appalachia and the Great Plains will not enjoy their re-
vival, and their economic decline will continue. The U.S. will have a smaller popula-
tion as a result, and geographic agglomeration will likely actually increase. Overall U.S. 
GDP will be lower, and the Americans working in the agglomerated sectors will have 
lower incomes. 
The U.S. press has been full of stories about the changes brought to the “new” immi-
grant destinations. For example, The Wall Street Journal described Dalton, Georgia, the 
home of three major carpet manufacturing plants, Shaw Industries Inc., Mohawk In-
dustries Inc., and Beaulieu of America LLC. Job opportunities for immigrants are plen-
tiful in Dalton. The U.S. carpet industry faces a situation similar to that of many U.S. in-
dustries faced with international competition and an increasingly scarce native work 
force: 
It didn’t make sense to leave. Carpet mills here have made huge investment in giant 
tufting machines that stitch yarn into plastic backing and dye tanks that soak color into 
bolts of weave the length of football fields. If the mills cut labor costs by moving off-
shore, they’d still face the extra expense of shipping heavy carpet back to their major 
market. Dalton is within a 24-hour drive of about 85% of all U.S. buyers. Industry con-
solidation over the past two decades strengthened carpet makers’ ties to the area, not 
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only making Dalton a one-industry town but also making Dalton a one-town industry. 
So, with the industry’s roots entrenched, Mexico has come to Dalton.11 
The community is changing along with the carpet industry’s workforce. In 2000, 
one-third of the children born in Dalton’s Hamilton Medical Center were from Hispanic 
families. There were 12,000 Hispanics in Dalton in 2000, and they have become notice-
able in the community: 
The sights and sounds of rural Mexico are everywhere along Dalton’s main drag, Wal-
nut Street, where accordion-rich music from Mexico’s north blares from quick-stop 
taco shops. Poster and fliers in Spanish tout at least 10 different agencies offering ways 
for recent migrants to send money home. Each morning, a refrigerator truck of an At-
lanta-based food distributor, Al Maizal, darts in and out of the local strip malls, stock-
ing more than two dozen Mexican restaurants and convenience stores. Florists, funeral 
homes and pharmacies all promise walk-in customers that “se habla espanol”12 
Not everyone in Dalton is happy about the changes their community is going 
through. Some years ago, the local newspaper had to stop running letters to the editor 
about immigration because the tone had gotten too angry. “Quit employing them, quit 
renting to them, quit educating them,” wrote one local citizen back in 1995. In 2005, 
over half the incoming kindergarten students were Hispanic. 
4. Explaining Hispanic Immigration 
According to Card and Lewis (2005), Mexican immigration to the U.S. was driven, 
on the supply side, by population growth, falling real wages, and persistently weak eco-
nomic conditions in Mexico. They also point out that immigrants tend to follow prior 
immigrants from the same cities and regions, and they find that prior immigrants also 
explain the supply of Mexican immigrants to the various regions of the U.S. On the de-
mand side, they hypothesize that immigrants are attracted by employment and wages. 
They find that supply side factors explain 75% of the variation in immigration, demand 
factors only another 10%. In fact, they find that after 1990, demand factors are not sig-
nificant in explaining inflows of Mexican immigrants; only supply push and prior flows 
determine immigrant inflows into specific counties in the U.S. Similarly, Richter, Tay-
lor, and Yunes-Naude (2006) find that the effects of changes in U.S. immigration policy 
or macroeconomic conditions on Mexican immigration to the U.S. are small compared 
to the network effects. 
There were some special events that help to explain the surge in Hispanic immi-
gration to the U.S. For example, Martin (2004) describes how unauthorized immigra-
tion from Mexico to the United States grew after the ratification of the North Ameri-
can Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) because free trade in corn pushed many Mexican 
11 Millman and Pinkston (2001). 
12 Millman and Pinkston (2001). 
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farmers off the land. Corn production in Mexico had been protected from imports, and 
a domestic price twice the world price had for years served as a social safety net in ru-
ral Mexico. When NAFTA came into effect in the mid-1990s, Mexico had about 3 mil-
lion corn farmers. This compared to the 75,000 corn farmers in just the state of Iowa in 
the United States, who produced nearly twice as much corn as Mexico at half the price. 
In part, the U.S. price of corn was low because of the U.S. government’s direct sub-
sidies and years of indirect subsidies through technical extension services and feder-
ally funded university research. It was not long after the establishment of free trade be-
tween the U.S. and Mexico that Mexican corn farmers abandoned their farms in great 
numbers. Many of these farmers migrated to the United States, most illegally. Richter, 
Taylor, and Yunez-Naude (2006) dispute this explanation of unauthorized Mexican im-
migration, however. Their statistical results do not give NAFTA a major role in driv-
ing Mexican immigration to the United States; as reported above, they find that overall 
macroeconomic trends in Mexico and the U.S. and immigrant network effects dominate 
in explaining immigrant flows. 
4.1   The Welfare Effects on the Source Hispanic Countries 
There has been little analysis of how the large outflows of Hispanic immigrants to 
the U.S. have affected the source economies. Clearly, the large numbers of people in-
volved suggest that the effects of the departure of so many people must have been sub-
stantial. For example, since the civil war in the 1980s, the rise in crime, and the brutal 
government crackdowns on dissent in El Salvador, over 15% of that Central American 
country has moved to the United States. Table 1 showed that there are about 11 million 
Mexican-born immigrants in the United States; that is more than 10% of Mexico’s cur-
rent population. 
Mishra (2006) applied immigration data for 1970 through 2000 in a standard theo-
retical framework, similar to the immigration model used throughout this book. She 
concludes that the departure of Mexican immigrants to the U.S. raised the wage of the 
average Mexican remaining in Mexico by about 8%. The wage effects differ greatly de-
pending on Mexicans’ levels of education, however. The wages of Mexicans with less 
than a high school education rose by only 5%, while the wages of high school graduates 
rose by about 15%. The reason for this disparity in wage effects is that a higher propor-
tion of the relatively small group of high school graduates left the country. The great 
majority of Mexican immigrants have less than a high school education, but an even 
greater majority of all Mexicans have not graduated from high school. Mishra also cal-
culates that the overall effect of Mexican immigration to the United States is to reduce 
Mexico’s 2000 GDP of $580 billion by about one-half of 1%, or $3 billion. The gain for 
workers staying behind is 5.9% of GDP, and the loss to the owners of the fixed factors is 
about 6.4% of GDP. In terms of the standard labor market model of immigration for the 
source country, which was illustrated in Fig. I.4 in the Introduction to Part I, p. 24, the 
area e = 5.9% of GDP, and the sum of e + g = 6.4% of Mexican GDP. 
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4.2   The Demand Effects of Hispanic Immigration 
The theoretical models of immigration discussed in earlier chapters suggest that 
immigrants have labor and product demand effects, as well as labor supply and 
complementary factor supply effects. The 41 million Hispanics in the United States 
clearly constitute a very large ethnic market. Spending by Hispanic households is 
estimated to exceed 8% of total household spending in the U.S. The size of this mar-
ket will continue to grow with the above average birth rates for Hispanics in the 
U.S. Also, as incomes rise from first- to second-generation Hispanic immigrants, the 
market grows further. And, it will grow if Hispanic immigration to the U.S. contin-
ues growing. 
It is interesting to note that marketers have suddenly recognized the importance 
of the Hispanics’ product demand effect on the U.S. economy. The Bank of Amer-
ica Corp. has begun offering credit cards to customers without social security num-
bers. Advertising revenue at Univision, the large U.S. Spanish language television 
network, and its smaller rival Telemundo grew by over 20% per year in the early 
2000s, about double the increase of overall television advertising revenue in the U.S. 
Marketers have been especially keen to identify themselves with Mexican holidays 
such as Cinco de Mayo. Corona beer, the Mexican brand that sells as a premium beer 
in the U.S., now uses cinco de Mayo to tout its Mexican heritage to all U.S. consum-
ers, spending over $2 million during the first week of May alone.13 Sears, Roebuck & 
Co. has recently begun to shift advertising expenditures from Cinco de Mayo to Mex-
ican Independence Day on September 16 because it felt Cinco de Mayo was becom-
ing too much of an “American” holiday, much the way St. Patrick’s Day or Oktober-
fest are enthusiastically celebrated by Americans of all ethnic backgrounds.14 Clearly, 
even though the simple labor market model of immigration does not recognize the 
growth in demand after the arrival of immigrants, the firms that supply the U.S. mar-
ket certainly do. 
5. Future Hispanic Immigration 
Mexico’s Ministry of the Interior did a study on the future of Mexican immigration 
to the United States. This study, prepared by the Ministry’s Consejo Nacional de Po-
blación (2001), provided alternative estimates under different assumptions about eco-
nomic growth in Mexico and the U.S. as well as different assumptions about future 
population growth in Mexico. The study concludes that with rapid economic growth 
13 Joel Millman (2001). 
14 Joel Millman (2001). 
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in Mexico and moderate growth in the demand for labor in the U.S., Mexican immigra-
tion to the U.S. will remain steady at about 400,000 per year. Such annual flows of im-
migrants imply that another 10 million Mexican immigrants will arrive in the U.S. by 
the year 2030. On the other hand, slow economic growth in Mexico and robust labor de-
mand in the U.S. would swell Mexican immigration to over half a million per year by 
2030. 
The study’s conclusions reflect some of the empirical studies of Hispanic immigra-
tion discussed earlier in this chapter: 
The narrow range in which these situations vary indicate that other factors closely re-
lated to the migration tradition of more than 100 years and the operation of complex so-
cial networks are apparently more determinative of international emigration than the 
impact of economic fluctuations in the labor markets in both countries.15 
In other words, most future immigrant flows from Mexico to the U.S. are inevita-
ble. Simcox (2002) attributes the government study’s conclusions to international pol-
itics: the alleged inevitability of more immigration could be used by Mexico to pres-
sure the U.S. government into adapting a more comprehensive immigration policy that 
permits more Mexicans to enter the U.S. legally. However, the Mexican government’s 
study does not conflict with existing evidence on immigration. 
5.1   Will Hispanic Immigration Continue? 
Not all studies predict continually increasing immigration flows from Mexico and 
other Latin American countries. The fact is that population growth in Latin America is 
slowing rapidly. This means that 20 years from now, there will be fewer young work-
ers. As already pointed out at the start of this chapter, Hispanic immigrants to the U.S. 
are disproportionately young and of working age, which has to some degree mitigated 
the problems associated with the ageing of U.S. society. But, it appears that Hispanic 
countries will not have as many young people to send to the U.S. in the future. Also, 
the currently young Hispanic population will age too, and Hispanics will eventually 
reach retirement age. 
Table 9 presents alternative estimates of the future size of the Hispanic population in 
the U.S. by Roberto Suro and Jeffrey Passel of the Pew Hispanic Center. The number of 
Hispanic immigrants is predicted to continue growing, and the growth is spread across 
first, second, and third generation Hispanics. These predictions suggest that Hispanics 
will have a strong impact on the U.S. economy and U.S. society in the future. The grow-
ing size of the Hispanic community in the U.S. will, no doubt, lead to increased interest 
in assimilation. Time will tell whether the Hispanic population in the U.S. will increase 
its rate of assimilation or whether the sheer size of the Hispanic community will con-
tinue to hamper the assimilation process. 
15 Quote is a translation provided in Simcox (2002). 
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5.2   Temporary Immigration Programs 
There have been suggestions that the U.S. should combat unauthorized immigra-
tion by instituting temporary immigration programs, such as the Bracero Program af-
ter World War II. Temporary immigration programs in Europe ended up increasing the 
permanent immigrant populations of many European countries, however. In order to 
assess whether temporary worker programs in the U.S. will end up reducing the unau-
thorized entry of Hispanic immigrants without adding to the further growth of the per-
manent Hispanic population, it is informative to look at a recent opinion survey of His-
panic immigrants by the Pew Hispanic Center described in Suro (2005). 
The survey covers a large number of Mexican immigrants who visited a Mexican 
consulate in the U.S. in 2004 in order to apply for a matricula consular, the widely used 
identity card issued by the Mexican government. Most Mexicans applying for such 
cards are unauthorized immigrants unable to gain U.S. documents. Therefore, the sur-
vey clearly presents a biased sample of Mexican immigrants. Mexicans who would nor-
mally immigrate illegally would be the primary applicants for temporary work visas if 
they were made available. 
The survey results show that by a 4 to 1 margin, respondents said they would par-
ticipate in a temporary worker program that would allow Mexicans to work in the U.S. 
for a limited number of years and then return permanently to Mexico. Yet, 42% of the 
respondents replied they would stay in the U.S. “As long as I can” and another 17% 
said they wanted to stay “for the rest of my life.” Only 27% said they intended to stay 
for less than 5 years. About three out of four respondents said they would participate in 
a program that offered the prospect of permanent legalization of unauthorized immi-
grants. In short, one could reasonably expect that many participants in any temporary 
immigration scheme would do what they could to remain in the U.S. when their tem-
porary permit expired. Like what happened in Europe in the 1960s, many guest work-
ers would become permanent residents and citizens. 
Table 9.  Alternative immigration scenarios for Hispanics: 2000–2020 
                                 Total                              1st                                2nd                                   3rd  
                                 Hispanic                       generation                  generation                       generation
Mid-range estimate:     
2000 35,306,000 14,158,000 9,887,000 11,261,000
2010 47,696,000 18,126,000 15,404,000 14,167,000
2020 60,424,000 20,555,000 21,659,000 18,210,000
High-range Estimate:     
2000 35,306,000 14,158,000 9,887,000 11,261,000
2010 51,013,000 20,761,000 16,086,000 14,167,000
2020 67,282,000 25,090,000 23,970,000 18,221,000
Source: Table 3 from Suro and Passel (2003). 
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6. Conclusions 
This chapter has presented some of the exceptional characteristics of the recent His-
panic immigration to the United States. In 2005, there were nearly 40 million Hispanic 
immigrants and descendants of Hispanic immigrants living in the U.S. The assimilation 
experience of this large cultural group does not seem to have followed the path past 
immigrants to the U.S. followed, and even most third generation Hispanics in the U.S. 
still find themselves with income and education levels substantially below the U.S. av-
erages. Some forecasts predict that as many as 60 million Hispanics will be living in the 
U.S. by 2020. It is no wonder that many Americans worry about the cultural effects of 
Hispanic immigration. 
Few other countries in the world are experiencing such a large inflows of people 
from a single foreign culture. Even if we recognize, and we should, that not all His-
panics are similar, it is still the case that nearly 60% of all Hispanic immigrants and 
descendants are from a single country, Mexico. Sociologists have studied Hispanic 
immigration much more thoroughly than economists because the cultural implica-
tions are so important. However, economists also need to pay more attention to His-
panic immigration because the size of Hispanic immigration implies that assimilation 
is likely to be much slower than would normally be the case for smaller immigrant 
groups. The slower pace of assimilation has very real economic implications. Also, 
the expansion of Hispanic ethnic enclaves has clear demand side implications. Ameri-
can business has already effectively recognized this in the form of more focused mar-
keting aimed at the Hispanic market. It may also be interesting to study whether the 
predominantly Hispanic immigration to the United States brings substantially differ-
ent outcomes compared to the more diverse immigration into the high income coun-
tries of Europe and to Canada or the greater Asian immigration flows to Australia, 
for example. In any case, the study of Hispanic immigration should not belong exclu-
sively to sociologists. 
Finally, the following quote helps to keep the often-emotional discussions of His-
panic immigration in a broader perspective: 
Few of their children in the country learn English … The signs in our streets have 
inscriptions in both languages … Unless the stream of their importation could 
be turned they will soon so outnumber us that all the advantages we have will 
not be able to preserve our language, and even our government will become 
precarious.16 
These words seem to represent the sentiments often displayed toward Hispanic 
immigration by commentators and Americans on the street. You will be interested to 
know that they were written nearly 250 years ago by Benjamin Franklin! Franklin was 
referring to German immigrants who had arrived in Pennsylvania in the 1750s! Those 
German immigrants, or at least their descendants, were eventually fully absorbed into 
16 Benjamin Franklin, quoted in Kenneth C. Davis (2007). 
340 H. Van den Berg & Ö. B. BodVarsson in The economics of immigraTion  (2009) 
U.S. society, and few Americans today could imagine why anyone would make such a 
fuss about German immigrants. Time will tell whether the fear that pervades discus-
sions of Hispanic immigrants will eventually be looked back on as having been just 
as misguided as Benjamin Franklin’s assessment of the Germans in eighteenth century 
Pennsylvania. 
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